Japanese Army (IJA) tactics are often reduced incorrectly to fanatical banzai charges and clumsy, wasteful attacks. While fanantical last-ditch assaults certainly existed in the later stages of the war, where quality officers and non-commissioned officer (NCO) cadre had evaporated due to sustained losses, this was not always the case. The IJA entering the Second Sino-Japanese War and eventually the Pacific, utilized tactical breakdowns that would be familiar to modern, contemporary armies. This article will touch briefly on a basic squad level manuever with future articles expanding towards larger formations, training, and other aspects of the Japanese Doctrine.
Diagram above showcases a drawn to scale deployment of a standard post-1937 oganization squad deployed in echelon. (Note: infantrymen 7-10 not pictured for size constraints.)
Echelon is the most common deployment for the IJA squad when expecting contact (i.e. an encounter battle). It allows for the most firepower to be brought to bear immediately on the enemy using the light machine gun (LMG) section while balancing ease of control and tactical flexibility as the squad leader has a ready reserve of rifleman. The rifle section is positioned far enough back to be out of any initial engagement but close enough to support the action as the situation developes.
Deploying the LMG section in a combat ready formation offers width and security for initial contact while keeping frontage small enough for direct control of the SL unlike a wider frontage movement such as a squad line. From this position the squad leader can direct the LMG fire to pin the enemy while directing his maneuvering and assaulting element (i.e. the rifle section).
Upon initiating contact, the squad will move from the initial echelon to a line with the LMG team providing the covering fire for the rifle maneuver element to deploy. Deployment is generally terrain dependent, but the default formation is pictured above, where the squad deploys to each flank of the LMG team. In this scenario, the squad at this point has developed a balanced engaging force centered around the LMG team. Neither flank is weighted, and the line can advance as a whole.
The squad leader has the alternative to deploy the entire rifle squad to either flank if the terrain is better suited for the attack. Like all encounter battles, the situation is fluid requiring inspired leadership and awareness from the SL and overall awareness/tactical knowledge of the riflemen. This portion of the battle is the commander “shaping” the battlefield and positioning his men for the attack.
The line formation is commonly used for platoon movements where the platoon is advancing in column to provide the maximum forward security, essentially the “echelon” formation writ large. Command and control however diminishes due to the increased width and it is expected the squad would be wholly invested with the rest of the platoon acting as the maneuver element (ie tactical decisions are moved upward in the order of battle).
!!! Note: The rifle squad deploys inversely. The person at the head of the column would deploy furthest outward while the rifleman towards the back of the column deploys closer to the LMG section. This is the same for any variation of this deployment (left, right, or center).
Like most militaries, the primary objective of the meeting engagement was to defeat the local enemy force and advance/improve the overall position of friendly forces. The most common means was by assault. Talented and well trained NCO’s make the difference in success or failure making the IJA heavily reliant on quality leadership, individual initiative, and tactical flexibility unlike many similar Great Power armies which relied on material superiority, doctrinal rigidity, and command hierarchy.
This also exposes the effectiveness of the squad to intangibles (morale, individual bravery, competency, talent, etc) which made the IJA squad so formidable early in the war but so lackluster towards the end as experienced and well trained NCOs and junior officers became casualties/replaced by rushed through conscripts.
The two diagrams demonstrate a few options the squad leader has available recreated from the junior officer handbook. Figure 1 demonstrates a balanced advance across the entire line utilizing the LMG as a base of fire. In this type of scenario the squad assaults forward more-or-less directly at the enemy, pressing their advantage in the meeting engagement to overrun the enemy line. Figure 2 offers a “flank” attack orientation, where the enemy is perhaps in less favorable ground for a general assault, or terrain supports this type of attack better. How the squad reacts and engages is wholly based on the squad leader’s situational awareness.
陸軍省 [著]『歩兵操典草案』,武揚堂書店,昭和12. 国立国会図書館デジタルコレクション https://dl.ndl.go.jp/pid/1463884 (参照 2023-04-25)