.C.M. Paine’s latest 2017 work The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War is the logical conclusion to her overall military history arch that examined Great Power rivalries in East Asia since 1996 and produced five different works, including this one. As such, she has quite a familiarity with the major forces that would influence the creation of Imperial Japan’s grand strategy, which “in distinction to military (or operational-level) strategy, integrates all relevant elements of national power” (p. 7). As such, one would expect a work that covers a broad spectrum of topics from the perspective of the Japanese military and civilian governments ranging from ideological representations of empire—like Pan-Asianism—to the physical ones—the required material needs and goals for the survivability of the empire. However, you would be hard pressed to find much of that in Paine’s work.

Instead, the reader is presented with a rather antiquated chronological examination of each of the major conflicts that Japan faced since the “Meiji Generation” told largely through secondary sources and translations. A quick examination of her limited bibliography reveals a dated historiography for a book published in 2017 and an almost complete neglect of any primary source material written by Japanese except for a handful of translated works. This would not be a problem if Paine did not often make claims that are pushing the envelope of the truth often accompanied by no citation or reasonable evidence other than her word. This couples with her often Orientalist worldview that pervades and distorts the work at each step, especially in her framing of the Modernity/ Westernization/ Progress vs Tradition/ Sinofication/ Stagnation paradigm (see page 18 for example). It is not that her assertions are wholly incorrect, but the framing is incredibly problematic in an academic setting, especially for one published so recently. 

Connecting each of her seven chapters together are two overall themes, the first tracing the internal debate that many Great Powers faced in the wake of Alfred T. Mahan’s seminole The Influence of Sea Power upon History that led to many leaders rethink grand strategy of becoming continental or maritime powers. The second theme develops from the tired arch that Japan was led to its actions in 1941 because of its incorrectly drawn conclusions from the pivotal First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5).

For those interested in yet another retelling of the causes, which Paine breaks into underlying and proximate, and military and diplomatic conclusions of these conflicts or have only limited working knowledge of Imperial Japan, then perhaps there will be something within the covers of The Japanese Empire for you. Otherwise, one would be better served spending your time reading any number of other foundational works that came before this.